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G.H.L Fridman*

Duress in the Canadian and
English Law of Restitution: A
Comparison

I. Introduction
The early history of restitution reveals that duress was relevant in two
situations.' In the first, one party compelled another to pay him money
by reason of some threat. In the second situation, one party compelled
another to pay him money which was in fact owed by a third party to the
one exercising the compulsion. The former situation was a straight
forward one, in which the party exercising the duress falsely or
legitimately (though perhaps erroneously) caused the party subjected to
the duress to accept that a debt existed between the two parties, or that
the party exerting pressure ought to be paid, so as to avoid undesirable
consequences. The latter situation was more complex, as there was never
any question of a legitimate debt existing or arising between the party
exerting pressure and the party paying. Whatever debt or obligation
existed, or was believed to exist on the part of the one exerting pressure,
also existed or was thought to exist between some third person and the
party exerting the pressure. One distinguishing feature between these two
situations was, and still is, with some important consequences, that in the
two-party situation the issue of duress might be intertwined with the issue
2
of mistake (so creating two potential sources of restitutionary recovery),
whereas in the three-party situation the issue was thought to be one of
bare duress, uncomplicated by questions of mistake. Another potentially
vital distinction was that in the three-party situation the action of the
party paying might give rise to the question whether his payment was
"officious" (the term that has come to be used to mark the difference
between a recoverable and a non-recoverable payment),? In the twoparty situation there could never be any question of officiousness. The
sole criterion for recovery was whether the appropriate pressure had been
exercised to justify recovery. These distinctions had, and still have,
material effects upon the chances of restitutionary recovery. They do not
detract from the fact that common to both situations was the problem of
*Professor of Law, University of Western Ontario.
1. Astley v. Reynolds (1732), 2 Stra. 915; Exall v.Partridge(1799), 8 T.R. 308.
2. This point is well taken in Posluns, Mistake and Compulsion: A Reappraisalof Eadie v.
Township of Brantford (1981-2), 3 Advocates' Quarterly 342.
3. Goff & Jones, Law of Restitution (3rd ed. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1986) at 309;
Hope, Officiousness (1929), 15 Cornell L.R. 25,205.
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determining the nature of the duress that might form the basis for a
successful action for restitution.
The more recent history of duress in relation to restitution has brought
to the surface the need to discover some theoretical or jurisprudential
foundation for invoking a plea of duress to substantiate recovery. Earlier
cases did not concern themselves with such theoretical inquiries. It was
enough that the defendant had exerted some appropriate pressure, such as
the threat of physical violence to the plaintiffs person or his goods (in the
nature of some actionable wrong, or criminal conduct).4 Developments
with respect to the nature of duress, Le., the kinds of threats that may
justify the use of the doctrine to permit recovery of money (or the
invalidation of a contract or liability in tort), have made it necessary, in
my view, to investigate the underlying basis of recovery; in other words,
the true nature of the idea of restitution. As long as the courts confined
the operation and scope of the plea of duress to the simplistic forms of
threats of physical or legal action, there was really no need to decide
whether the reason for permitting the operation of duress was that the
victim's will was overborne, or his consent was lacking in volition, or it
would be unjust to leave the plaintiff without a remedy, or the plaintiff's
payment was not officious. Once duress was understood to extend to
other forms of pressure, some deeper explanation of the rationale for
judicial intervention and recovery had to be sought. The present state of
the law, notably in Canada, invites attention to the fundamentals of
restitution.
II. The Development of Duressin Restitution
1. Two-Party Situations:Money
There has been a gradual development from the initial elementary notion
of duress to the person, in the form of physical violence or threats of
physical violence, through the ideas of duress colore officii and duress to
goods, to the more modern concept of so-called "economic duress". Even
before the leading English case of Maskell v. Homer,5 a Canadian court,
in Cushen v. Hamilton,6 was prepared to accept that, in appropriate

circumstances, a threat to the business activities of the party threatened,
which could be looked upon either as duress of goods or economic
duress, might be a basis for permitting recovery of money paid in
4. Or (i) the threat of legal process jeopardizing the freedom of the plaintiff; (ii) the making
of a demand by virtue of the defendant's office, with consequent hazard to the plaintiff's rights.
5. [1915] 3 K.B. 106.
6. (1902), 4 O.L.R. 265 (C.A.), followed in Colwood Park Association Ltd v. Oak Bay,
[1928] 3 D.L.R. 812 (B.C.S.C.); Vancouver Growers Ltd v. Snow Ltd, [1937] 4 D.L.R. 128
(B.C.C.A.).
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consequence. No recovery was allowed in that case because the plaintiff
had a viable alternative to submission to the threats, in contrast with the
position of the plaintiff in Maskell v. Homer. In the Cushen case the
plaintiff was a butcher who was informed by the City of Hamilton that
he must pay a fee in order to continue his business. He protested the
order, saying that it was illegal and not justified, in the sense of being ultra
vires the Hamilton Council. But he did not go to the lengths of refusing
to pay and undergoing prosecution for carrying on an unlicensed
business, which might have allowed him to litigate the validity of the
demand. He paid and only later sought recovery of his payments. He
failed. The threat to his property was not as immediate as the threat
involved in Maskell v. Homer. However the Canadian case did illustrate
a number of matters. Firstly, the idea of duress had progressed beyond the
elemental notion of violence to the person. Secondly, it required some
direct, immediate threat that left the threatened party with no escape
from the coercion save payment if he wished to avoid the unpleasant
consequences. Thirdly, the party threatening might not knowingly be
guilty of any wrongful act, since he might be acting under the mistaken
belief that he was entitled to the payment in question. Fourthly, even
though the demand for payment was made under a mistaken belief as to
the state of the law, and the payment was therefore made under a mistake
of law (which would normally preclude recovery), recovery was possible
by reason of the duress. This last point is now fully accepted, and has
been endorsed by decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in more
7
recent times.
By the twentieth century courts in England and Canada permitted
recovery, in what I have termed a two-party situation, where there was
never any danger to the person of the party threatened or members of his
family, but there was possible danger to his property. As Beatson pointed
out some years ago,8 English courts differentiated contract cases from
restitution cases where duress of goods was concerned. Such duress
substantiated a claim for recovery of money, (ie., restitution) where it
would not allow the party subjected to such duress to avoid a contract
entered into in consequence. We now know that this is no longer the
law.9 Nor is there any justification for any such differentiation. Duress of
7. George (Porky) Jacobs EnterprisesLtd v. City of Regina (1964), 44 D.L.R. (2d) 179;
Eadie v. Township ofBraniford (1967), 63 D.L.R. (2d) 561; Hydro Electric Commission of
Nepean v. OntarioHydro (1982), 132 D.L.R. (3d) 193.
8. Beatson,Duressas a Vitiating Factorin Contract(1974), 33 C.LJ. 97.
9. The Sibeon and The Sibotre, [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 293 (Q.B.D.); North Ocean Shipping
Co. v. Hyundai Construction Co., [1978] 3 All E.R. 1170 (Q.B.D.); Pao On v.Lau Yu [1979]
3 All E.R. 65 (P.C.); Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v. I.TWE, [1982] 2 All E.R. 67,
at 75 per Lord Diplock, 88 per Lord Scarman (H.L.); cp.: Sundell & Sons Pty. Ltd. v. Emm
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goods is firmly established as a recognised type of duress for purposes of
restitution and contract. In the last forty or more years it appears that
courts in England and Canada have broadened the scope of duress even
further in relation to two-party situations.
Courts in both countries have been taking into account the realities of
commercial and economic life. What might seem to be an extension of
duress beyond reasonable limits, given the original nature of the behavior
that amounted to duress, is nothing more than recognition of the true
reason for accepting the plea of duress of goods, namely, that if the party
threatened is deprived of his goods by wrongful detention or destruction,
he will suffer economically. He will lose the opportunity to take
advantage of his possession of such goods. Note that duress to goods does
not involve any denial of the threatened party's ownership of the goods.
It is possession that is at stake. Hence the threatened party could always
sue in tort for the appropriate remedy. The real point is that time is
against him in this regard - he must have the goods now. It is therefore
necessary to prove that deprivation of the goods would have an
immediate harmful effect upon the plaintiff if a plea of duress to goods is
to be successful as a basis for recovery of money paid. The natural
development from this is to treat any conduct by the defendant that
involves some immediate threat to the economic welfare or well-being of
a plaintiff who has no chance of any alternative action in time to avoid
such threat from materialising to his detriment, and where there is
assertion of a rival title to anything on the part of the party threatening,
as substantiating a claim for the recovery of money paid in consequence
of the defendant's actions. Originally, emphasis was placed upon the
nature of the threatened harm, viz., whether it concerned the plaintiff's
goods. Later the crucial issue was not the nature of the threatened harm,
but the immediacy and effectiveness of the threat, insofar as it could place
the plaintiff in a situation where he had no viable alternative but to pay,
else incure irretrievable loss. If the plaintiff could forego payment, suffer
the harm, and then sue for damages to compensate him for such loss,
there would be no need, nor any theoretical justification, for a
restitutionary action. The absence of any tortious act on the part of the
defendant uttering the threats was the underlying stimulus to the
evolution of duress of goods into something more, something that might
be called duress to commercial opportunity (or, as it has been called in
the English cases, "economic duress").
Yamoulatos (1956), 56 S.R. (N.S.W.) 323; RE. ListerLtd v.Dunlop Canada(1979), 27 O.R.
(2d) 168 (C.A.) (reversed on other grounds (1982), 135 D.L.R. (3d) I (S.C.C.)); see Ogilvie,
Wrongfulness, RightsandEconomic Duress(1984), 16 Ottawa L.R. 1.
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The courts have stressed the vital importance of the immediacy of the
threat and nature of the pressure it placed upon the plaintiff. They have
been less concerned with the nature of the duress. For example, in the
Canadian case Knutson v. Bourkes, 0 the defendant, who threatened not
to complete a real estate transaction, knew that this failure might cause
the plaintiffs to suffer damage through their inability to complete other
transactions by which they were bound. The Supreme Court of Canada
decided that money paid as a result of such threats was recoverable in
restitution. But in Twyford v. Manchester Corporation," a case
resembling Cushen v. Hamilton, the threat by the defendants to prevent
the plaintiff from enjoying his business at Manchester Cemetery unless he
paid a license fee was not a potential source of recovery of the money
paid in consequence. The plaintiff was not immediately obliged to pay or
suffer loss. He could have tested the legality of the defendants' demand
instead of submitting to it. Although there was no threat of seizure of the
plaintiffs goods or property, as there had been in Maskell v. Homer,but
only a threat to the business life of the plaintiff, as in Cushen v. Hamilton,
the real issue was whether the threats in question gave rise to no possible
alternative other than payment or the incursion of loss.' 2 In other words,
what courts have been looking for in these modem, extended varieties of
duress is something very much akin, in economic or commercial terms,
to the highwayman's traditional formula: "Your money or your life". In
these situations it is the plaintiff's "economic" life that is the alternative
to his money. But the position is the same, and so, it would seem, is the
legal result. There is one difference, however. The highwayman's threat
involves an illegal act. The modem economic highwayman may be guilty
of no actual illegality, or threat of illegality. What he calls his justification
for the payment may have no legal foundation whatsoever, as in the case
of payments demanded under delegated or other legislation that is ultra
vires or otherwise void. It does not entail the commission of any criminal
or tortious act.
A threat to break a contract, as in Knutson v. Bourkes and a number
of more recent English cases, 13 is "illegal", as explained in Rookes v.
Barnard14 But "illegal" does not mean here what "illegal" means
10. [1941] S.C.R. 419.
11. [1946] Ch. 236. Contrast Mason v. New South Wales (1959), 102 C.L.R. 108, where there
was an additional factor, viz., a threat to exercise a purported power to seize the plaintiff's
property (lorries not carrying permits that the defendants required the plaintiff, invalidly, to pay
for in order to carry on his business).
12. Cp. Birks, Restitutionfrom PublicAuthorities (1980), 33 Current Legal Problems 191, at
192-193. Twyford was not threatened with exclusion from the cemetery.
13. See the cases cited supra,note 9.
14. [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.); cp. Morgan v. Fry, [1968] 2 Q.B. 710 (C.A.); J.T Strafford&
SonsLtd v. Lindley, [1965] A.C. 269 (H.L.).
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elsewhere. What we do not know, however, and what the House of
Lords has left open in in its latest statements on the issue,' 5 is the scope
of the "illegality" recognised in Rookes v. Barnard What kind of
pressure (in particular, commercial pressure), apart from a threatened
breach of contract, may be so "wrongful", may go so far beyond the
boundaries of what is acceptable, as to be capable of amounting to duress
justifying the recovery of money paid in consequence? If by this question
the courts intend to re-emphasise the nature of the conduct, instead of the
nature of the pressure and the immediacy of the threat, the statements in
the Universe Tankships16 case may be pointing backwards to the era
when the courts were concerned with the type of contract that could
support a claim for restitution on the basis of duress. If, however, the
House of Lords was only reiterating the need to show that the party
exerting pressure was making it impossible for the threatened party to act
in any other reasonable way, for self-protection of its economic interests,
than by paying the money demanded, it may still be possible to assert that
the modem law of duress is less concerned with the nature of the conduct
alleged to be wrongful pressure than the effect that conduct has upon the
victim of the pressure in question.
The Canadian development of what has been called "practical
compulsion" leads to the conclusion that it is not so much the kind of
duress that is important as the kind of pressure it exerts. However, it must
be observed that virtually all the cases in which this problem has arisen
concerned demands for money that were thought to be valid but were
founded upon ultra vires legislation or resolutions of governmental
authorities. In other words, there was something "illegal", in the broader
(not the narrow criminal) sense underlying the demand for money and
the threats that were explicit or implied in such demands. Hence, it could
be said that Canadian courts have not yet had to contend with the issue
raised in the Universe Tankships case - namely, what kind of improper,
unlawful, or wrongful pressure can potentially constitute duress such as
would support an action for restitution? However, it is still pertinent to
consider the way in which Canadian courts have approached the
problem of duress, since it at least shows that, in modem times, courts are
concerned with the nature of the threat that is posed by an improper
demand for money as much as, if not more than, the nature of the
conduct that constitutes the threat.
The starting-point for any such. discussion is the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Eadie v. Brantford17 What is significant
15. Universe TankshipsInc. of Monrovia v.L TWE, supra, note 9 at 75-76 per Lord Diplock,
88-89 per Lord Scarman.
16. Id
17. Supra, note 7. Note, however, the earlier case of George (Porky)Jacobs v. Regina,supra,
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about this case is that, perhaps for the first time, a court took into account
the personal situation of a plaintiff as well as the economic circumstances
that were in the background. The Eadiecase demonstrates what might be
called the "outer limits" of the concept of duress. It involves
psychological rather than economic or physical duress, and opens the
door to strange possibilities, which perhaps is why it has more often been
distinguished on the facts than followed.
In the Eadie case the plaintiff was forced to pay a severance fee to a
municipality and provide the municipality with a strip of land for certain
purposes as conditions for the grant of approval of the plaintiffs plan to
subdivide his land. These demands were founded on a by-law which later
was held to be invalid and the plaintiff sued for the return of his money.
He succeeded at trial, but that decision was reversed by the Ontario
Court of Appeal. However, on further appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada the plaintiff was successful. The plaintiff had originally objected
to the payment, but later succumbed to the demands of the municipality.
Why, then, was he able to recover his payments? The basis of the court's
decision was the doctrine of "practical compulsion", which was derived
from earlier Canadian cases, and, ultimately, from Maskell v. Homer. In
the words of Spence J., speaking for the majority of the court, the
payment was "made under the compulsion of urgent and pressing
necessity". 18 In this case the necessity stemmed from the situation of the
plaintiff and his wife. The plaintiff had to go to the hospital for treatment.
This involved leaving his wife alone in their house, which was isolated
and distant from the town. Hence the plaintiff wished to sell his property
and move his wife elsewhere. To achieve this he needed to subdivide the
property which, in turn, required the approval of the municipality. To
obtain this approval, he was obliged to accede to the municipality's
demands for money and land. In his judgment, Spence J.placed more
emphasis on the idea of compulsion that on the notion that the pressure
was such as to leave the plaintiff with no viable alternative.
It was submitted by counsel for the respondent that in order to justify the
plaintiff demanding repayment of money paid under mutual mistake in
law upon the basis that he was under compulsion to do so, the plaintiff
must have been faced with a situation where there was no other alternative
available to him. I am of the opinion that the bar to the plaintiff's recovery
is not so stringent and that a practical compulsion is alone necessary. 19
note 7, where duress or compulsion outflanked the argument that money was paid under a
mistake of law, which would have negated recovery. Since it was decided that the mistake was
one of facl not law, the remarks about compulsion are obiter dicta See also: Pillsworth v.
Coburg [1930] D.L.R. 757 (Ont. C.A.); City of St John v. Fraser-BraceOverseas Corp.,
[1958] S.C.R. 263.
18. Idat 570.
19. Id at 571.
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Spence J. then referred to the course of action the plaintiff might have
taken to establish the invalidity of the municipality's demand. But that
course, and the alternative courses in earlier Canadian cases in which
Maskell v. Homer was approved and followed, "were time-consuming
and impractical". The possible alternative course "...would, of necessity,
have been so fraught with delays that the sale of the property would have
been lost. In the meantime the appellant was languishing in hospital. It
was at that very time that he had the paramount need of selling the
property and establishing his wife into other habitation more suitable to
their circumstancs, not months or even years later". 20
The Eadie case seems to concentrate on (a) the practicality of the
payment as compared with other altenatives; and (b) the possible harm
the plaintiff may immediately suffer if he does not pay. It de-emphasises
the element of duress, in the sense of both the wrongfulness of the
defendant's conduct and the lack of any choice open to the plaintiff.
What seems to emerge from the Eadie case is a greater importance of the
plaintiff's motives for making the disputed payment, rather than the
question whether his intention to pay was produced by some improper
conduct by the defendant that resulted in a denuding of the plaintiffs
assent to the transaction of any real legal value.
It has been said that the concept of practical compulsion as it appears
from the Eadie case is not easy to understand.2' The Law Reform
Commission of British Columbia, when considering the recovery of
benefits conferred under a mistake of law, was obliged to take into
account the various cases where the defence of mistake of law was
overcome by a plea of duress, or, in the post-Eadie world, practical
compulsion. 22 After referring to the fact that the development in Eadie
indicates a lesser relevance of a plaintiffs will and a growth in importance
of the idea of "voluntariness", the Report mentions that different cases
have come to different conclusions on whether a plaintiff was acting
under a practical compulsion. "This uncertainty", says the Commission,23
"reflects a certain amount of confusion respecting the principles on which
this exception (to the mistake of law doctrine) is based".
There can be little doubt that more recent Canadian cases in which this
issue has been raised present a confusing and conflicting array of
decisions and reasons, making it difficult, if not impossible, to point with
20. Id at 571-572.
21. A.J. Seversen Inc. v. Village of Qualicum Beach (1982), 135 D.L.R. (3d) 122, at 126 per
Hutcheon J.A. (B.C.C.A.).

22. Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Benefits Obtained Under aMistake of Law
(1981), at 41-48.
23. Id at43.
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any degree of accuracy and certainty to the true scope and application of
the Eadie decision. The prevailing view, I suggest, is that the courts

should look at the motive behind the plaintiff's ultimate assent to the
making of the payment, despite his protests or objections to its validity.
If there never was any real need for the plaintiff to pay the money in
order to protect his property or economic interests;24 if there never was
any real protest at the time the demand was made;2 or if the reason for
the payment was "commercial expediency" rather than the kind of

psychological, sentimental, and ultimately economic compulsion that
was present in the Eadie case;26 then courts will not allow recovery.
Moreover, if the plaintiff has not unjustly enriched the defendant at the
plaintiff's expense, but has, in fact, obtained a benefit from the payment,
recovery will not follow, even though there was some element of
27
compulsion present in the circumstances.
These cases reveal that the Canadian attitude is more flexible and
liberal than that of the English. English courts are still largely concerned
with the wrongfulness of the pressure and the legitimacy of the demands,

rather than the motivation that underlies the plaintiff's submission and
payment or the immediacy of the danger to the plaintiff. Canadian courts
are more concerned with the notion of restitution. The underlying
principle of unjust enrichment does not emphasise the "wrongfulness" of

the defendant's conduct, even though the enrichment that might support
a claim for recovery is supposed to be "unjust". But "unjust" here does
not perforce entail any wrongful acts on the part of the defendant. It
relates more to the inequality or imbalance of the positions of the parties.
24. J.R.S. Holdings Ltd v. Districtof Maple Ridge (1981), 122 D.L.R. (3d) 398, at 405-407
(B.C.S.C.).
25. Ronell Deps. Ltd v. Duncan (1981), 25 B.C.L.R. 123 (Cty. Ct.). But payment under
protest is not enough to show compulsion: GlidurrayHoldings Ltd v. Village of Qualicum
Beach (1982), 129 D.L.R. (3d) 599, at 601-603perNemetz C.J.B.C. (B.C.C.A.).
26. GlidurrayHoldings Ltd v. Village of Qualicum Beach, supra, note 25 at 607-409 per
Seaton J.A.; G. Gordon FosterDevs.Ltd v. Township ofLangley (1980), 102 D.L.R. (3d) 730,
at 740 per Aikins J.A. (B.C.C.A.).
Could it not be argued however that all cases of "economic duress" or practical compulsion
involve some kind of commercial expediency? If so, what is the true distinction between cases
where the plea is successful and those where it is not? The courts have not yet resolved the issue
of the difference between desires or objects that could support a claim for recovery and those
that will permit the court to hold that the plaintiff was not acting out of duress at all, but was
seeking to attain a certain object which would have been frustrated by the denial of the licence,
etc, if he had not paid.
27. GlidurrayHoldings Ltd v. Village of Qualicum Beach, supra, note 25 at 615-616 per
Anderson J.A.; AJ Seversen Ina v. Village of QualicumBeach, supra,note 21 at 127-128 per
Hutcheon J.A.
But it could be argued that the money paid by the plaintiff was paid to obtain a totally
different benefit, which the plaintiff did not get; therefore he was not really benefited from his
payment and the defendant has been enriched when he would otherwise not have been.
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If seems to point to the inherent injustice that would follow if the parties
were left in the situation that resulted from the plaintiffs payment to the
defendant. 28 Since Degiman v. Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada,29 if not
before, Canadian courts have taken a different approach from that found
in England. They took as the source of their jurisdiction in restitution
cases the idea found in the Fibrosa case 30 that civilised systems of law
were bound to provide remedies for unjust enrichment or unjust benefit
to prevent a man from unfairly retaining money or some benefit derived
from another.
2. Two-Party Situations:Services
Canadian courts have also had to contend with situations where the
plaintiffs claim is for services rendered under what has been
characterised as duress or compulsion. The typical situation, which arose
about twenty-five years ago, is as follows. Under a contract between
plaintiff and defendant, the former is bound to do certain work for the
latter. This is done, but the defendant alleges that it has been done badly
or improperly and requires the plaintiff to make good the deficiencies.
What makes the situation a potential claim for recovery based on duress,
or something similar, is that the defendant makes threats to the plaintiff
to persuade the plaintiff to do the work. Such threats take the form of
blacklisting the plaintiff, so that he will not get further work, or alleging
faulty workmanship that may provide the foundation for an action
against the plaintiff for breach of contract. In response to such threats the
plaintiff performs the work and now sues in quantum meruit for payment.
Claims in several such situations ultimately met with no success in the
courts. The plea of duress or coercion was not accepted. The work was
held to have been done voluntarily, and not under compulsion.3 1 Only in
the dissenting judgment of Cartwright J. of the Supreme Court of Canada
in PeterKiewit Sons' Co. of CanadaLtd v. Eakins Const Ltd 32 has the
28. Klippert, Unjust Enrichmen4 (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), c. 2.
29. [1954] S.C.R. 725; see also Angus, Restitution in CanadaSince the Deglman Case (1964),
42 Can. B.R. 529.
30. FibrosaSpolka Akcyjna v. FairbairnLawson Combe BarbourLtd, [1943] A.C. 32, at 6162 perLord Wright (H.L.).
31. City of Moncton v. Stephen (1956), 5 D.L.R. (2d) (N.B.C.A.) (but see: Terminal
WarehousesLtd v. J.H. Lock & Sons Ltd (1957), 9 D.L.R. (2d) 490 (Ont. H.C.), decided
differently on other grounds, viz., the negligence of the party doing the extra wiork; Morton
Construction Co. Ltd v. City ofHamilton (1962), 31 D.L.R. (2d) 323 (Ont. C.A.)). In contrast,
more recently, the extra work could be compensated in Re MunicipalSpraying & Contracting
Ltd (1982), 15 B.L.R. 39, where Goodridge J. of the trial division of the Newfoundland
Supreme Court preferred to follow the approach in Maskell v.Homerrather than the approach
in PeterKiewit Sons Co. ofCanadav. EakinsConstructionLtd, infra, note 32.
32. [1960] S.C.R. 361, criticized by Goff & Jones, supra, note 3 at 232-233. The learned

Duress in the Canadian and English Law of Restitution

idea of "practical compulsion" been accepted in a similar situation. The
plaintiffs in that case entered into a contract to drive timber piles for piers
for the purpose of constructing a bridge across Vancouver Harbour, on
the basis of the plans and specifications in the main contract (the plaintiffs
being subcontractors dealing with the general contractor). A month later,
the engineer for the Bridge Authority added a requirement to the plans
that certain piers had to be driven further than originally required. The
plaintiffs objected to this addition, saying that it entailed considerable
"overdriving" not called for in the original plans on which its successful
tender had been founded. The engineer insisted that his instructions be
followed, without additional payment. Although this disagreement
persisted, the plaintiffs performed the work and then sued for the value
of the "overdriving". They were unsuccessful in the Supreme Court of
Canada. In later decisions the Kiewit case was followed, and recovery
was permitted, or not permitted on a contractual (not restitutionary)
basis, on the ground that the contract itself could be construed so as to
33
allow for the additional work.
Judging by these cases, the extension of the scope of duress or
compulsion outside the payment of money situation would appear to be
limited. Courts do not seem to be prepared to regard threats that induce
the performance of extra work as the kind of threats that justify a
subsequent restitutionary claim. One reason for this is that the kind of
threats made are regarded as legitimate, not illegal. Perhaps the
municipalities which were the defendants in these cases did not act with
the highest degree of commercial morality. But they were not guilty of
any illegal conduct when they exerted pressure on the plaintiffs to
perform the extra work, unlike the various defendants in the payment of
money cases, in which ultra vires legislation was relied on as the
foundation for the claims to be paid.3 4 Furthermore, it might have been
thought that the plaintiffs in the "service rendered" cases did have viable
alternatives. They could have refused to do the additional work and
allowed themselves to be sued, just as the butcher in the Cushen case
authors prefer the pragmatic approach of the Australian courts in Sundell & Sons Pr. Ltd v.
Emm Yamoulatos, supra, note 9; Mason v. New South Wales, supra, note 11; Deacon v.
Transport Regulation Board [1958] V.R. 458; Re Hooper and Grass' Contrac4 [1949] V.R.
269; and that of United States' courts.
33. Swanson Const. Co. Ltd v. Government of Manitoba (1963), 40 D.L.R. (2d) 162 (Man.
C.A.); Electric Power Equipment Ltd v. RC.A. Victor Co. Ltd (1964), 41 D.L.R. (2d) 727

(B.C.S.C.).
It is significant that the Law Reform Commission of British Columbia has recently
recommended that the law as stated in the Kiewit case be changed so as to permit recovery of
compensation in such instances: Performance UnderProtest(Working Paper No. 46, 1984).
34. Cp.: Angus, Restitution in CanadaSince the Deglman Case (1964), 42 Can. B.R. 529, at
533.
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could have refused payment and allowed the municipality to prosecute
him for the alleged offence. Perhaps, therefore, these cases provide very
weak examples of duress or compulsion bringing about the performance
of work, and cannot afford much support for the argument that the
duress or compulsion doctrine can apply equally well and forcefully to a
"services rendered" situation as it does, or can do, to a "payment of
money" one. But more recent Canadian developments with respect to
unjust enrichment, or restitution, have led at least one court in Canada to
take a very different view.35 This would indicate that the performance of
work under pressure can substantiate a claim for payment (in the absence
of a contract). The fact-situations giving rise to such a claim can involve
the sort of "urgent and pressing necessity", to quote from Eadie, that
supports any such action. Both the successful and unsuccessful cases are
indicative of the Canadian insistence upon an investigation of the motives
or reasons for the plaintiff's response to the threats, either by paying the
money demanded or performing the work required. The reference in one
case 36 to the lawfulness of the threat by the municipality may suggest the
court was looking at the nature of the threat, as English courts have done
and continue to do. At the same time, however, the Canadian decisions,
which stress the contractual aspects of the situation, seem to be
differentiating "voluntary" from "involuntary" conduct on the part of the
plaintiff, 37 which seems to be more connected with the plaintiffs state of
mind and rationale for his behaviour than the defendant's legality or
illegality in making the demand.
The fact that the Kiewit case was recently distinguished by a
Newfoundland court38 and strongly criticised by the Law Reform
Commission of British Columbia39 suggests that there may be some
movement towards enlarging the scope of duress in relation to the
provision of services in some commercial situations. In the Newfoundland case the court held that extra work performed under protest by a
contracting party accused of improper performance was compensable
because it had not been provided freely or voluntarily. In the Working
Paper of the British Columbia Law Reform Commission it was pointed
out that the present state of the law, as represented by the Kiewit case,
made matters very difficult for contractors. If they did not perform the
extra work they might be sued for misperformance. If they performed the
35. Cp.:Re MunicipalSpraying & ContractingLtd ConstructionCo. Ltd v. Hamilton,supra,
note 31.
36. Morton ConstructionCo. Ltd v.Hamilton, supra,note 31.
37. Re MunicipalSpraying & ContractingLtd., supra, note 31 at 56-57.
38. Id at 48-53.
39. PerformanceUnder Protest(Working Paper No. 46, 1984), at 13-19.
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extra work they mighf not obtain additional remuneration despite the
argument that such work was performed under protest, Le., under duress.
The Commission suggested that legislation should make payment for
such services possible.
In conformity with the broader approach to restitution or unjust
enrichment to which reference has been made, Canadian courts are more
inclined to accept the invocation of duress in appropriate circumstances.
In the context of the present discussion the reason for this is the greater
awareness of the realities of business life, notably in the construction
industry with which these cases were concerned. There are signs in
England that judges are prepared to consider what actually happens in a
commercial or industrial situation, despite the technicalities of the law of
the contract. 40 Canadian judges and lawyers have anticipated such
developments, and have been amenable to the adaptation of, and the
remedies provided by, the law in order to accommodate the reasonable
expectations and requirements of the community, especially, but not
exclusively the commercial or business community. Perhaps this is the
product of a society that is organised differently from that in England, in
which the values are not necessarily the same. Perhaps it is the result of
the earlier fusion in Canada of legal and equitable jurisdictions and the
absence of any marked distinction between courts of law and courts of
equity. Perhaps it is the greater influence on Canadian judges of the legal
system of the United States, where business, economic, and social factors
resemble those which operate north of the border. Whatever the reason,
there can be little, if any doubt that the law in Canada is much less strictly
doctrinal in its attitude. There is greater willingness to experiment and to
develop along new lines of thought. Admittedly such an approach has its
disadvantages, but it enables the Canadian courts to deal with new
problems more flexibly than in England. So, in respect to the matter now
under discussion, there may be more use for the concept of duress in twoparty situations in Canada than in England.
3. Three-PartySituations
The typical three-party situation involves a payment by P of money
which is owed by D to T. subsequently, P sues D to recover the payment
made on the latter's behalf. What distinguishes the restitutionary situation
from analogous cases of assignment or surety is the issue of duress or
compulsion. In the restitution situation P has discharged D's debt because
40. Br. Steel Corp. v. ClevelandBridge & EngineeringCo., [1984] 1 All. E.R. 504 (Q.B.D.);
on which see Ball, Work Carried Out in Pursuance of Letters of Intent - Contract or
Restitution?(1983),99 L.Q.R. 572.
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of pressure put on P by . Were it not for that pressure, the payment by
P might not discharge D's debt (it might still not, according to some
writers). Nor might it give rise to any form of recovery by P against D
(although it might be possible for P to recover his payment from T).41 In
such situations, what is the test of recovery?
In Owen v. Tate4 2 the English Court of Appeal adopted with approval
the summary of the law given by Goff and Jones, 43 which reads as
follows:
To succeed in his claim for recoupment, the plaintiff must satisfy certain
conditions. He must show (1) that he has been compelled by law to make
the payment; (2) that he did not officiously expose himself to the liability
to make the payment; and (3) that his payment discharged a liability of the
defendant.
The key requirement here is that the payment was "compelled by law".
In these situations, in contrast with the two-party situations previously
considered, the compulsion that amounts to duress or its equivalent is not
a "practical" compulsion, or, as Goff and Jones put it, a "moral"
compulsion, but a legal compulsion. They instance three groups of
cases: 44 relief of property from distress, assignment of leases, and
abatement of nuisances. But they state that these categories are not
exclusive. What emerges from their discussion, as well as the way the
problem was handled in Owen v. Tate, would seem to be that, to qualify
for recovery, the payment must have been made because of some actual
liability of a legal kind on the part of the plaintiff. The cases they cite and
analyse deal with situations where the successful plaintiff was legally
obliged to pay the amount in question, but the consequence of that
payment was the release of the defendant from liability to the party
demanding payment from the plaintiff. Notwithstanding the characterisation of Goff and Jones, it may be said that such instances are not
examples of compulsion at all, certainly not of duress. There is a valid,
legal obligation to pay, not merely a demand for payment that is totally
unfounded in law, as well as fact. What Goff and Jones, and the Court
of Appeal in Owen v. Tate, are doing is distinguishing between payments
which are not "voluntary", because there was a debt to be discharged by
the plaintiff (as well as the defendant), from those which are completely
voluntary, in the sense that the plaintiff acted "officiously", i.e., to do

41. This is discussed in Birks and Beatson, UnrequestedPayment ofAnother's Debt (1976), 92
L.Q.R. 188; Friedmann, Payment ofAnother's Debt (1983), 99 L.Q.R. 534.
42. [197611 Q.B. 402.
43. Supra, note 3 at 309.
44. IMat 310-315.
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someone a favour, or to fulfil some moral or sentimental obligation
(which was the case with the plaintiff in Owen v. Tate).
What happens in circumstances where there was no legal obligation to
pay, or the plaintiff believed he was obliged to pay? What happens if his
motive for paying was to benefit himself, rather than the defendant, and
it turns out that the latter derived the advantage? On the analogy with the
two-party situation, one would deduce that the payment is irrecoverable,
since there was no threat of unwelcome or undesirable consequences if
payments were not made. However, there are decisions where, in
circumstances without any duress or compulsion as earlier discussed, a
payment or an expenditure of money was recoverable from the party
who ultimately benefited. These cases really involve mistakes of fact
rather than compulsion. However, the circumstances are also consistent
with the possibility of some form of compulsion. What makes them most
interesting, in the present context, is that the compulsion did not always
involve some kind of threat of the sort that might have justified recovery
on the basis of duress in its original or extended version.
For example, in Canadian Mortgage Association v. Regina,45 A
mortgaged Lots 36 and 40 to C. Subsequently C discharged Lot 36 from
the mortgage. C, the plaintiff in the action, mistakenly paid taxes on Lot
36, on the belief that it was still included in the mortgage, since the Lot
was advertised for sale by the City of Regina under the provisions of the
Saskatchewan Arrearsof TaxesAct When the taxes were paid, the city
removed Lot 36 from the list of lots for sale. On discovering the truth, C
sued for the return of the tax money, and was successful. The judgment
of Edwards J. proceeded on the basis of money paid under a mistake (but
was this a mistake of fact or of law?). The judgment of Lamont 3. was
founded on the idea of compulsion, in that C believed that if the taxes
were not paid, C would lose title to Lot 36 under the provisions of the
statute. Looked at in this light the case resembles later decisions involving
ultra vires demands. The only difference is that the demands were based
on a mistaken view of the true facts, not a mistaken belief in the validity
of the demand for payment. But C was really discharging A's liability to
the city because of C's fear that, by not paying, he would incur some
liability (namely, the forfeiture of his title). C might have relieved his
anxiety much more easily than the plaintiffs in the Eadie or the Jacobs
cases since he did not have to engage in any costly or prolonged litigation,
but simply had to verify the facts. Nevertheless Lamont . was prepared
to apply the doctrine of compulsion to permit recovery.

45. [1917] 1 W.W.R. 1130 (Sask. S.C.).
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In a more recent case, Carleton v. Ottawa,46 the Supreme Court of
Canada applied general restitutionary principles, culled from Lord
Wright's speech in the Fibrosa case,47 as utilised by the Supreme Court
in Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada,48 to allow the local
government authority, which had paid the cost of an indigent's stay in a
home for several years when that liability really fell on another local
government, to recover from the latter. The relationship between the two
governments was founded on a contract, but there was a fundamental
mistake as to the extent of each government's territorial jurisdiction. It
was believed the indigent came within the plaintiff's sphere when in fact
she fell under the jurisdiction of the defendant. Was this a case of
recovery of money paid under a mistakenly believed compulsion of a
valid and operative contractual obligation? The answer is not clear. But
if this can be treated as a "compulsion" case, rather than a "mistake"
case, it would appear to throw some doubt on the formulation of Goff
and Jones and the English Court of Appeal in Owen v. Tate. The legal
compulsion of which they speak would not actually have to exist, as long
as it is mistakenly believed to exist. The real test, then, would be not legal
compulsion but the absence of "officiousness". On that basis, any
payment on behalf of another that was made, to refer to the Eadie
formula, out of some "pressing and urgent necessity" would be
recoverable, even where it was not a payment to the defendant.
The matter is more complicated by two cases, one Canadian and the
other English, where a payment to a third party was not made out of any
pressing need comparable to the situation in the cases just discussed, but
was made for the payer's own purposes under the mistaken belief that, by
spending the money, the payer was advancing his own interests. In Krebs
v. World Finance Co.,4 9 the British Columbia Court of Appeal did not
allow recovery of this money from the party who ultimately reaped the
benefit of the payment. The plaintiff bought a car subject to a chattel
mortgage, which he discharged. Later he discovered that he had acquired
no title to the vehicle, which belonged to the defendant. He tried to
recover from the true owner the money paid to the chattel mortagee, but
he failed. But in Greenwood v. Burnetg50 the improver of the motor car
was able to recover from the true owner of the car the money spent in
improvements. There are other cases, notably in Canada, where
46. [1965] S.C.R. 633; cp:. Macfarlane& Wellington Hotel (Barrie)Ltd v. Kennedy (1956),
3 D.LR. (2d) 757 (Ont. H.C.).
47. Supra, note 30 at 61.
48. [1954] S.C.R. 725.
49. [1958] 14 D.L.R. (3d) 405 (B.C.C.A.)
50. [1973] 1 Q.B. 195 (C.A.).
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improvers of land who, believing that they had or would in the future
have title to the land in question, spent money on the land or property.5 1
In those cases, which have been criticised, 52 it was held that the improver

was able to recover from the true owner, even though the latter could
validly assert that the alterations or expenditures concerned did not

benefit him. While it is true that these cases proceeded on the ground of
mistake rather than compulsion, they may aid to support the proposition

that a payment that was mistakenly believed to be compelled might be
recoverable from the party who benefited from such payment. The
difference between such cases and true instances of compulsion or duress
lies in the absence of any emergency, necessity or threat to the economic
welfare of the party paying. On the other hand, the mistaken non-owner

in Krebs (who failed), the similar party in Greenwood (who succeeded),
and the mistaken non-owners of land in the other Canadian cases were
presumably purporting to improve their economic situations by their
expenditures. They had a good reason for doing what they did, as good
a reason, in their various ways, as the plaintiff in Eadie (although,
perhaps, not under circumstances of such stringency from the personal,
psychological, or even economic point of view).
What differentiates such instances from so-called cases of "officiousness" would seem to be the element of mistake. In all other respects,
however, they are prime illustrations of payments made in the absence of

any compelling need to make them. If mistake can make such a
difference, why can it not also make a difference in true three-party

"compulsion" cases? That would certainly explain CanadianMortgage
Association v. Regina and Carleton v. Ottawa In this respect perhaps it

should be noted that, as the Supreme Court of Canada has suggested may
be possible in cases of mistaken payments, 52- a payment made under
51. Reeve v. Abraham (1957), 22 W.W.R 429 (Alta. S.C.); Estok v.Heguy (1963), 40 D.L.R.
(2d) 58 (B.C.S.C.); Preeper v. Preeper (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 74 (N.S.S.C.). Contrast
Nicholson v. St. Denis (1976), 57 D.L.R. (3d) 699 (Ont. C.A.), where the improver had no
actual or misconceived claim to the property on which the work was done. A different
principle was applied. The plaintiff, who provided the improvements, acted at the request and
under a contract with a party who did have a claim on the property that was improved, by
virtue of an agreement of purchase and sale made with the defendant, the vendor of the
property. Because the party who engaged the services of the plaintiff later defaulted in his
payments under the agreement of purchase and sale, he forfeited his interest in the property.
The Ontario Court of Appeal, reversing the trial judge, held that the defendant was without
any knowledge of what was going on, had not requested the improvements and was
completely innocent of any wrongdoing that should make him liable to the plaintiff (who, in
any event, had sued the intended purchaser of the property and recovered judgment against
him and had not pursued his rights under the Mechanics'LienAct).
52. Jones,RestitudonaryClaimsfor Services Rendered (1977), 93 L.Q.R. 273 at 293-294.
52a. Rural Municipality of Storthoaks v. Mobil Oil CanadaLtd (1975) 55 D.L.R. (3d) 1;
Fridman and McLeod, Restitution,(Toronto: Carswell, 1982) at 112-123.
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duress or compulsion might be irrecoverable on the ground that the
innocent payee has changed his position in reliance on the payment.5 2b So
in an Owen v. Tate situation, if the bank, having received satisfaction of
the debt from the plaintiff, released the original debtor at his request or
with his consent, recovery might be denied. Of course in any such
situation it would have to be proved that the defendant, whose debt has
been discharged, has behaved innocently. This means that the defendant
must not have been a party to the compulsion, must have received the
benefit in good faith, and must have acted in consequence in a way that
indicates he has done something he would not have done, and would not
have been able to do, if the debt had not been discharged on his behalf
by the plaintiff.s2 It might be difficult, although not impossible, for all
this to be established. In cases of mistake, the plea of change of position
does not appear to have been very successful so far, no more so than a
plea of estoppel. In theory, however, there is no reason why such a plea
might not be a complete defence to an action for restitution in three-party
duress situations as it can be in mistake cases.
The possibility that this might be the eventual result of the
development of the law lies once again in the evolution in Canada of a
much broader concept of "unjust enrichment" than in England. For
example, in More v. University of Ottawa,53 the decision appears to be
54
founded on dicta of Lord Wright in Brooks Wharf v. Goodman Ltd
The situation was one in which the parties failed to clarify in their
contract what was to happen on a change of circumstances, as in the
Kiewit case. But there was no duress. In More the plaintiff paid extra sales
tax on materials used in constructing a building for the University. The
University was able to obtain the benefit of a tax refund which the court
held had to be passed on to the builder, although the strict terms of the
contract only dealt with the tax situation at the time of contracting, and
did not provide for what was to happen if more or less tax became
exigible. This was not a true case of mistake or compulsion, in the
traditional senses. It appears to be a decision based exclusively on the
idea that to allow the University to hide behind its tax shelter as a
charitable institution at the expense of the builder would result in the
University's unjust enrichment at the builder's expense, a conclusion that
was unacceptable to the court.

52b. This may be regarded as a variation of estoppel or as a distinct equitable plea.
52c. The facts in Owen v. Tate would have negated this, because the debtor did not want the
plaintiff to deal with his, the debtor's, debt in any way.
53. (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 666 (Ont. H.C.).
54. 11937] 1 K.B. 534 (C.A.).
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4. Necessity or Emergency
At first sight, what is sometimes referred to as "necessitous intervention"55 may not appear to have any connection with the classical duress
situation, or even with the more extended notion of duress which has
been described earlier. Whatever dangers might provide the impetus for
the payment or expenditure of the plaintiff's money, or the performance
of some service by the plaintiff for the defendant, cannot be regarded as
creating any threat to the physical or economic well-being of the plaintiff.
But the connecting factor between "necessitous intervention" cases and
instances of duress or compulsion is the existence of a "pressing and
urgent necessity" which exerts pressure on the plaintiff to act in the
absence of any prior authorisation or consent on the part of the
defendant. The plaintiff acts as he does because there is no other viable
alternative to his intervention. The various possibilities have been
examined in detail and depth elsewhere.5 6 Suffice it to say that they all
seem to involve the lack of any opportunity to seek instruction or
approval in advance, and the existence of some operative emergency that
threatens the physical safety of the defendant or his property (or, in
certain instances, the necessity for discharging some obligation that is
placed on the defendant by the law, such as the duty to bury a deceased
person). The parenthesised circumstances resemble the cases of threeparty compulsion discussed above. Other situations more closely
approximate the typical two-party situation. In both, however, the
gravamen of the plaintiff's claim for reimbursement or recovery is that he
was forced to act as he did out of what might legitimately be termed
"practical compulsion".
English courts have been reluctant to extend the scope of such
situations of emergency or necessity, whether by denying the application
of the doctrine of agency of necessity or otherwise.5 7 Canadian courts, on
the other hand, have been more amenable to the idea that, if it can truly
be said that the defendant has benefited at the expense of the plaintiff,
there is a juridical basis for recovery.5 8 This was held to be the case even

55. See, eg., McCamus, NecessitousInterventiorn The AltruisticIntermeddlerand the Law of
Restitution(1979), 11 Ottawa Law R. 297.
56. Id,;GoffandJones,supra,note 3, c. 15; Fridman and McLeod, supra, note 52a, c. 16.
57. Fridman, Law of Agency, (5th ed. London: Butterworths, 1983) at 117-126. For a
contrary view see Birks, Negotiorum Gestio and the Common Law, [1971] Current Legal
Problems 110. See also: China Pacific S.A. v. Food Corp of India, [1981] 3 All E.R. 688

(H.L.).
58. Hastings v. Semans, [1946] 4 D.L.R. 695 (Sask. C.A. ); Samilo v. Phillips (1968), 69
D.L.R. (2d) 411 (B.C.S.C.) (affirmed on appeal on different grounds (1971), 70 D.L.R. (3d)
283 (S.C.C.)); and see the curious case of Sherrin v. Hagerty,[1953] O.W.N. 962 (Cty. Ct.).
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when the defendant did not really benefit, as in Matheson v. Smiley,5 9
where .despite the valiant efforts of the plaintiff, the defendant died.
Indeed, in that instance, it might be argued that the defendant would have
rejected the plaintiff's proferred aid, since the defendant was attempting
to commit suicide, and would not have desired to be saved from death.
Clearly, in such cases the basis for recovery is not what the defendant
would have wished the plaintiff to do should the plaintiff have sought
instructions from the defendant, but the court's attitude that the efforts of
the plaintiff merited some recompense or reimbursement. Once again a
deeper consideration of the situation leads straight back to the question:
What is the underlying basis for restitutionary recovery? It is not just
necessity or an emergency. Nor is it any belief that there would have been
an agreement of some kind had the parties discussed the situation in
advance. 60 It must be that situations of this kind, involving as they do
some commendable behaviour on the part of the plaintiff, coupled with
his desire to avoid some disastrous consequence (in these instances to
another, not to himself), entitle the court to conclude that recovery ought
to be permitted on general grounds of restitution or unjust enrichment.
III.

The Basis ofRestitutionaryRecovery

There are potentially two ways of investigating the juridical nature of
duress in relation to restitutionary claims. The first is to look at duress,
however it may ultimately be defined or described, in conjunction with
duress in other contexts, namely, contract, tort and the criminal law, with
a view to propounding some generalised concept that will explain the
operation of the plea in all of them. The second is to discuss restitutionary
claims founded on some conception of duress in terms of the law of
restitution generally. This entails adopting the attitude that whatever
duress may mean or involve in relation to tort liability, the validity of
contracts, or criminal responsibility, it must be understood in the context
of restitution in a way that is consistent with the fundamental nature of
restitutionary recovery. These conflicting approaches have been
exemplified in a recent exchange. 61
Atiyah, in criticising the "overborne will" theory of duress in relation
to the modem English "economic duress" cases, takes into account the
59. [19321 2 D.L.R. 787 (Man. C.A.).
60. But see the theory of "hypothetical contract" considered in Long, A Theory of
Hypothetical Contract(1984), 94 Yale U. 415. For another explanation of why the law does
not compensate "rescuers", see Levmore, Explaining Restitution (1985), 71 Virginia L.R. 65
at 102-104.
61. Atiyah (1982), 98 L.Q.R. 197; Tiplady (1983), 99 L.Q.R. 188; Atiyah (1983), 99 L.Q.R.
353.
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decision of the House of Lords in Lynch v. D.PP of Northern Irelanda62
with a view to arguing that the criminal law connotation of duress should
be applicable in other legal contexts. Tiplady supports the "overborne
will" theory, and attacks what might be termed the "unitary" or, to
borrow a phrase from another context, 6 the "lump" theory of duress. He
prefers the view that what amounts to an "overborne will" may differ
according to the context in which the relevant questions are asked. It is
interesting to note that neither author appears to have considered cases of
restitution. Their language suggests, however, that their arguments should
also apply to such instances.
This difference of opinion, even though it only tangentially affects the
law of restitution, reveals something of the nature of the problem that
confronts anyone considering the nature of restitutionary recovery for
duress. From what has been suggested earlier, there seem to be various
potential claimants for the role of guiding principle in such cases. One is
the concept of "overborne wilr'. Another is the more contractual idea of
lack of consent. A third is an amalgam of equitable ideas such as injustice,
inequality, unconscionability and the like. A fourth is the notion of
"officiousness", as previously explained.
A further possibility, which, at first sight, seems to be a reference back
to the now discredited idea that restitution is founded on "implied
contracts", is contained, in different versions, in some recent American
writing on restitution. Although the authors in question do not directly
deal with the problem of duress, but with other restitutionary situations
such as unsolicited benefits, improvement of property, payments made
under mistake, substitute performers (the three-party situation previously
discussed), rescuers and other volunteers (the necessitous intervention
situation), it could be argued that their explanations of restitution are
applicable to the duress situation.
One author suggests a theory of "hypothetical contract", i.e. a contract
"that a court writes for the parties because it is convinced that both
parties would have agreed to its terms at the time the unsolicited benefit
was conferred". 64 Although this theory is stated with reference to a
particular instance of restitutionary recovery, 65 it might be argued that, in
62. [1975] A.C. 653.
63. Vz., sale of goods: see Llewellyn, Through Title to Contractand a Bit Beyond (1937-38),
15 N.Y.U.L.R. 159; Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Sale of Goods, VoL 1
(1979), at 259,262.
64. Long, A Theoryof HypotheticalContract(1984), 94 Yale L.J. 415 at 415.
65. iz., restitution for unsolicited benefits. See also Birks, Negotiorum Gesto and the
Common Law, [1971] Current Legal Problems 110; Jones, RestitutionaryClaimsfor Services
Rendered (1977), 93 L.Q.R. 273; McCamus, Necessitous Intervention The Altruistic
Intermeddlerandthe Law ofRestitution (1979), 11 Ottawa LR. 297.
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view of the discussion of the situations where the plaintiff acts to save life
or property, there is something in this theory, which is founded on an
economic approach to law, that could be used in the more general
context of duress.
Another theoretical approach to restitution discusses the question of
whether courts should create bargains where the parties have not done
SO.66

The first, or hypothetical contract theory is described as "a logical
extension of the law of contract". 67 But the theory does not conflate
contract and tort: it explicitly distinguishes cases decided by extending
contractual principles from cases decided on non-contractual principles.
The second, or "bargain" theory of restitution, as it may be called, is said
to illuminate the "assymetrical structure of private law". 68 Restitution is
distinguished from "its much-studied neighbours", tort and contract, on
the basis that restitution deals with non-bargained benefits, tort law with
non-bargained harms, and contract with bargained benefits and harms.
Whereas the law of torts regularly "creates" bargains by assigning liability
where the parties would have exacted payment if able to bargain, the law
of contract (and restitution) does not obviously intervene and create
bargains among strangers who might be expected to wish for such
agreements. The law of benefits is apparently not the counterpart of the
law of harms. 69
Such theories may not be attractive to English (or Canadian) lawyers
who, historically, have adopted very different attitudes from those
embraced by lawyers in the United States with respect to restitution.
Moreover, the American emphasis on the economic analysis of law as a
means of "explaining restitution" may not convince judges, particularly
in Canada, where the underlying approach, as evidenced in recent
decisions, notably of the Supreme Court of Canada, 70 seems to be one of
remedying unjust enrichment. This is rejected as a competing analysis by
the protagonist of the "hypothetical contract" theory. 71
These writings indicate attempts are being made in the United States
to move away from traditional explanations of restitution arising from
duress. It is unlikely that such theories will find favour in the courts of
England or Canada, where whatever explanation of the duress cases

66. Levmore, ExplainingResdtiulion (1985), 71 Yiiginia L.R. 65.
67. Long, supra, note 64 at 434.
68. Levmore, supra,note 66 at 67.
69. Id
70. See Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 831; Rathwell v. Rathwel [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436;
Palachikv.Kiss (1983), 146 D.L.R. (3d) 385; see also Klippert, supra,note 28, c. 2.
71. Long, supra,note 64 at 417-418.
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ultimately emerges will probably be based upon the ideas found in the
precedents rather than in the views of economics-oriented theorists.
Moreover, so far as the "hypothetical contract" theory is concerned,
courts that have slowly, but surely shed the accumulated detritus of
history, and now eschew any theory of restitution that savours its original
historical foundations, are unlikely to adopt a view of restitution that
seems to require a return to something like a contractual view of
restitution.
The problem with the "overborne will" theory, as argued by Atiyah
with some justification, 72 is that it appears to negate the fact that the payer
of money, or provider of services, acts with the intention of paying or
providing. In all the various duress situations there is no doubt that the
plaintiff who is seeking recovery or reimbursement always intended to
pay the money or provide the services. The issue is not whether he
intended to do so, but whether his intention was arrived at freely. Fear of
consequences, lack of alternative, and pressure of circumstances may all
operate on the plaintiffs mind to produce the necessary intention. He
ultimately reaches a stage when, for whatever reason or motive, he
intends to pay or act. In the various kinds of duress situations the real
issue is the plaintiff's motive or rationale for paying or acting, not his
intention to pay or act. 73 As recently pointed out by the Supreme Court
of Canada, 74 in the context of criminal responsibility in a situation of
alleged necessity, there is a difference between "justifying" and
"excusing" certain conduct. Necessity, in the criminal context, may
excuse the behavior in question: it does not justify it. So, too, in the
present context, the fact that there was some relevant kind of duress,
compulsion, or pressure on the plaintiff may explain (Le. excuse) his
payment or provision of services: it does not justify it, in the sense of
making it valid, thereby precluding a court from upsetting the transaction
and ordering recovery or reimbursement. As in cases of restitution for
duress, there is a distinction between the intent to make the payment, and
the reason why the payment occurred.
Lack of consent as a ground for restitutionary recovery is equally
unsatisfactory. In the first place, it seems to invoke contractual principles
in a non-contractual context. Secondly, it points to the involuntary nature
of the payment, distinguishing true cases of recovery from those where
the plaintiff's act was voluntary. It does not carry the analysis much
further to rely on a voluntary/involuntary dichotomy,75 because it
72.
73.
74.
75.

Supra, note 61.
Cp. Philips, Are CoercedAgreementsInvoluntary?(1984), 3 Law & Philosophy 133.
Perkav. The Queen (1985), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
Fridman & McLeod, supra note 52a, at 61-62.
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becomes necessary to determine what is voluntary and what is
involuntary. Moreover, as with the "overborne will" theory, an
explanation founded on lack of consent seems to overlook that the
plaintiff's conduct, for whatever reason, was intentional. What occurs in
restitution cases is much the same as what happens in contract cases
where some vitiating element such as mistake or fraud is alleged. The
apparent consent of the plaintiff is set aside because his intention to
contract was the product of some misconduct by the defendant or some
aberration of his own. This permits a court to upset an apparently valid
contract because the policy of the law is not to hold parties to bargains
that are entered into under dubious circumstances, such that suspicion is
thrown on the genuineness of a party's reasons for entering into it. In
certain circumstances justice may require that a transaction be upset, even
if it involves risk to third parties, and, afortiori, if no third party is likely
to be affected by the decision. Whatever theoretical or doctrinal
explanation is given of the technical principles of law applied by courts
in reaching a decision, the underlying explanation is that the contract in
question was not justifiable, and it would be unfair to hold the parties to
such a bargain. To do so would create an imbalance. One party would be
prejudiced to the advantage of the other, or, to put it differently, one
party would be unjustly enriched at the expense of the other.
The notion of "officiousness" is more appropriate and relevant in
certain situations than in others. Although it could be utilised to explain
all the different varieties of duress, according to the explanation offered
earlier, it can only be explained and understood by analysing the cases
where a party has or has not been held to be "officious". Any such
analysis forces a court to consider more deeply the motives of the
plaintiff, to discover whether or not he is entitled to recover.
Perhaps the only valid explanation of the duress cases, linking
restitution with other areas of the law, and providing a consistent
theoretical basis for the various instances of restitutionary recovery for
duress or analogous conduct, is what might be termed "the injustice of
the transaction". Restitutionary recovery for duress is founded upon the
principle of unjust enrichment, which provides a juristic basis for all
forms of restitutionary recovery. Underlying this traditional notion of
unjust enrichment is another fundamental proposition that has recently
been suggested, though not for the first time,76 as lying at the root of
restitution. "The appropriation by one person of another's property ought
to give rise to a right of restitution". 77 Admittedly, this suggestion was
76. Stoijar, Law of Quasi-Contrac (Sydney: The Law Book Co. of Australasia, 1964) at
5-9.
77. Friedmann, Restitution ofBenefits Obtained Through the AppropriationofPropertyor the
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made in relation to other instances of restitutionary recovery, notably
those concerned with what is referred to as "waiver of tort". However,
this analysis can have relevance to the duress cases. Certainly in those that
involve the payment of money to, or on behalf of the defendant, it may
be argued that the defendant, in effect, has misappropriated the plaintiff's
money and thereby obtained a benefit. In cases of "necessitous
intervention" the defendant may have obtained either the plaintiff's
money or property, or their equivalent in services. Even if the "property"
approach or theory is not acceptable, there remains the basic notion of
unjust enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff as a valid explanation for
the granting of recovery or reimbursement.
English courts have not been too enthusiastic about any such
explanation. Canadian courts, notably in recent years, have increasingly
accepted this idea as the fundamental juridical principle upon which
courts permit or disallow restitutionary recovery. They constantly refer to
the principle of unjust enrichment as providing the basis for recovery of
money, division of acquisitions, and reimbursement for services
provided. 78 As Morden J. said in More v. University of Ottawa:79 "The
categories of restitution are never closed". There may be some wellaccepted, historical instances of restitutionary recovery in which the
plaintiff's success is unquestionable. Those instances do not form a closed
list to which new situations can never be added. On the contrary, the
underlying principle of unjust enrichment justifies new applications in
appropriate circumstances. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada
has used the principle of unjust enrichment to permit apportionment of
property or money acquired by a party who made such acquisitions
through the combined efforts of himself and someone with whom he was
cohabiting, whether or not the parties were married.80 Although the tool
employed by some judges to achieve such apportionment was the
constructive trust, the motivation for employment of that tool was the
idea of preventing the unjust enrichment of the male party at the expense
of the female. The same fundamental principle has been applied by
Canadian courts in cases of duress, or "practical compulsion". For
example, in Glidurry Holdings Ltd v. Village of Qualicum Beach,8
Commission of a Wrong (1980), 80 Col. L.R. 504 at 510. For a different view see Klippert,
Restitutionary Claimsfor the Appropriationof Property(1981), 26 McGil L.J. 506; and for
another view of waiver of tort see Hedley, The Myth of Waiver of Tort (1984), 100 L.Q.R.
561.
78. Fridman, Reflections on Restitution (1976), 8 Ottawa L.R. 156 at 163-174.
79. (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 666 at 676 (Ont. H.C.).
80. Rathwell v. Rathwel4 supra, note 70; Pettkus v. Becker, supra note 82; and see: Murray
v. Roty (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 705.
81. Supra, note 25.
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where recovery was denied by the British Columbia Court of Appeal,
one judge, Anderson J.A., held against a claim for recovery on the
ground that the plaintiff had received a benefit for the payment of the fee
that was being claimed back in the action. (In return for such payment
the plaintiff had received the benefit of the installation of off-site water
services that improved the quality of his land, and were the monetary
equivalent of the fees paid by the plaintiff. 82) In Hydro Electric
Commission of Nepean v. OntarioHydro,83 another leading case, the plea
of money paid under mistake of law was alleged to be outflanked by the
plea of compulsion. The Supreme Court, along with the trial judge and
the Ontario Court of Appeal, paid close attention to what might be called
the "competing equities" of the case to determine whether recovery
should be allowed. The plaintiff had paid too much money to the
defendant under the belief that legislation justified such payments for
power supplied by Ontario Hydro. Although the case was largely
concerned with the effects of a mistake of law, and the lower courts did
not consider the plaintiff's equitable right to recover, the case is
instructive in the present context as it reveals the attitude adopted by
Canadian judges to cases of restitutionary recovery. Actions of this kind
are considered "equitable" in character; not in the strict, historical
meaning of equity, but in accordance with the broader, more
fundamental sense in which the term is used.
There appears to be considerable scope for the application of such
ideas in cases in which the newer varieties of duress are claimed (Le. those
not involving actual or threatened violence to the person or property of
the plaintiff). Similarly, in three-party situations, the test for recovery may
legitimately and appropriately be framed in terms of the conflicting
equitable claims of the parties, with a view to discerning whether or not
the defendant has been unjustly enriched by the plaintiff's act of paying
the money involved. Even in the "necessitous intervention" cases it can
be argued that whether or not recovery or reimbursement should be
permitted ought to depend on the equities of the case, the balancing of the
benefit to the defendant against the wisdom of recognising the type of
intervention with which the particular case is concerned. Should the
policy of the law be to encourage such intervention or deter it? In the
context of "waiver of tort", or appropriation of another's property, one
84
author has recently referred to deterrence as a basis for restitution. It
might be said that the granting or denial of recovery in cases of
82. Note, however, the point made supranote 27.
83. (1979), 92 D.L.R. (3d) 481; (1980), 107 D.L.R. (3d) 257; (1982), 132 D.L.R. (3d) 194,
on which see McCamus, 17 U.B.C.LR. 233.
84. Friedmann, supra, note 77 at 509-510, 551-556.
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necessitous intervention could also operate either as an acceptance of
certain conduct as being desirable and laudatory, or as a deterrent of
conduct that is considered to be unacceptable because it thrusts unwanted
burdens on a party behind his back, or encourages the creation of
obligations when it is obvious that the party alleged to be under the
obligation would never willingly have undertaken such an obligation had
he been given the opportunity to accept or reject it.
The idea of unjust enrichment can be regarded as a vital principle,in
the Dworkinian sense, which itself enshrines a policy (again in the
Dworkinian sense). 85 Indeed, this may be an excellent example of the
merging or lack of distinction between these two notions. Where does
principle end and policy begin? The goal of the law is presumably to
achieve a just and equitable result through the mechanisms of legal
doctrine. In this respect perhaps the law has not altered since Roman
times, when it was categorically affirmed that "no one be made richer
through another's loss".86 Cases of duress, in whatever form, are prime
illustrations of this idea. The tenor of restitution in modem Canadian, if
not English, law reveals the extent to which judges in the various
Canadian jurisdictions have been imbued with this principle and have
utilised it to provide for restitutionary recovery.
English courts, when faced with restitutionary issues, or cases which
might call for a solution based on restitution, appear to be much more
controlled by earlier precedents. If the circumstances can legitimately fall
within the scope of an existing type of restitutionary recovery, the court
will be prepared to grant recovery. From time to time this involves some
reconsideration of the essentials of a successful action or the limits of a
defence to an otherwise successful action. Such decisions are not founded
upon any generalised concept of restitution, but upon the detailed
examination of the prior case law and reflection upon its scope or
meaning.87 In Canada, however, although earlier decisions are of value
and must be considered, the courts appear to be more willing to abandon
the stereotyped instances of restitutionary recovery and to embrace a
broad principle that is capable of infinite, or almost infinite expansion.88
85. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London: Duckworth, 1978) at 22-3 1. For criticisms
of Dworkin's view, see Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligationof a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin
Dispute (1977), 75 Mich. L.R. 473; Donnelly, Principles,Persons andHorizons: A Friendly
Analysis of What Dworkin has Overlooked (1982), 26 St. Louis U.L.J. 217. See also Umana,
Dworkin's "Rights Thesis" (1976), 74 Mich. L.R. 1167.
86. Pomponius, Digest, 12.6.14. Note, however, the suggestion that restitution does not
necessarily involve the defendant's enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff; see Dawson,
Restitution WithoutEnrichment(1981), 61 Boston U.L.R. 563.
87. See, eg., Barclay'sBank v. Simms, [1979] 3 All E.R. 522 (Q.B.D.).
88. Cp. Morden J. in More and Sons v. University of Ottawa, supra, note 79 at 676. "The
principles take precedence over the illustrations and examples of their application."
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Restitution has ceased to be a collection of isolated instances where
recovery is possible and permitted in the light of previous decisions.
Instead, Canadian courts treat restitution as a cause of action in itself, and
investigate the circumstances to discover whether the fundamental notion
of restitution is applicable to the particular facts. The possible reasons for
this, as mentioned earlier, may include a more flexible attitude in Canada
to precedent; a desire to achieve substantial justice without overmuch
regard for the technical niceties of the legal system, an extension, as it
were, of the nineteenth century rejection of the old forms of action in
favour of a more basic substantive law approach to legal remedies; and
a more populist attitude of Canadian courts compared with their English
counterparts, as evidenced by their greater willingness or ability to look
beyond the strict legal principles that may apply to an individual case and
at the rationale of those principles. Whatever the cause, the final
consequence is that Canadian courts have arrogated to themselves a
greater freedom of action in restitution cases.

